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Income insurance as a risk management tool after 2013 CAP reforms? 
 
Abstract 
Concerns on increasing farm income volatility after 2013 CAP reforms, has led the European 
Commission to propose an income stabilization tool to be implemented throughout the whole of 
the  European  Union.  The  proposed  tool  is  designed  as  an  insurance  scheme  compensating 
farmers if income drops below a  certain level.  As insuring  a farmer’s  income is not trivial, 
among others from a measurement and incentive point of view, the aim of this paper is to review 
insurance  designs  for  income  and  price,  and  to  elicit  experts’  opinions  on  the  total  “risk 
management arena” in the European Union. Results show that the proposed EU wide income 
stabilization tool is likely to face problems of asymmetric information reducing its effectiveness 
and attractiveness. In addition, we perceive that it may  yet be too early to introduce such a 
scheme as other private and public-private risk financing solutions covering (parts of) a farmer’s 
income have not yet been fully explored, especially not in eastern EU countries. Even innovative 
schemes such as “business continuation insurance” may prove to be a more feasible alternative. 
 




Income from farming is rather volatile due to stochastic factors that affect production and prices. 
Throughout the  years, various risk  management tools have been used to reduce, or to assist 
farmers to absorb, some of these risks. Also the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the 
European Union has taken away some of the risks through a variety of mechanisms that support 
prices  of  many  agricultural  products,  such  as  direct  payments,  refunds  for  milk  and  eggs, 
intervention  storage  of  butter  and  pigmeat and disturbance  clauses  in  case  of severe  market 
disruptions.  Farm-level  risk  profiles  throughout  the  European  Union  are  however  likely  to 
change (Majewski et al., 2008; Meuwissen et al., 2008a; High Level Group on Milk, 2010). 
International trade agreements can be expected to lead to price liberalization and to a greater 
exposure  of  European  farmers  to  competitive  market  forces.  Production  risks  may  change, 
among others, due to a more regulated use of herbicides, medicines and vaccines. Changes are 
also  occurring  in  relation  to  risks  of  catastrophic  events  such as  floods,  droughts  and  pests. 
Knemeijer  et  al.  (2009)  expect  such  catastrophic  events  to  happen  more  frequently  and 
potentially with more severe consequences. Even more, the predictability of the impact of crises 
seems to worsen due to unknown consumer responses and public pressure to apply new control 
strategies (Longworth et al., 2008; Meuwissen et al., 2009). 
 
For  policy  makers  and  farmers  designing  an  income  insurance  scheme  seems  an  interesting 
option to cope with future volatility and uncertainty. The interesting fact being among others that 
income insurance is a  “basket product” in which  you don’t need to  worry about underlying 
triggering events and overcompensation of low yields while market prices have already covered 
for the losses. In line with this, several countries already offer some form of−subsidised−income 
insurance or income stabilization scheme. In the USA, private companies deliver and service 
revenue insurance schemes.  Subsidies are provided for the farmer-paid premiums, for delivery 
and administration, and for the private sector reinsurance. Farmers pay about 25 per cent of the 
total cost of risk management programs. Also Canada has a rich history of income stabilization   3
tools,  starting  with  the  Net  Income  Stabilisation  Account  (NISA)  from  1991  up  to  2004, 
followed by the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilisation (CAIS) program (2004-2007). This 
program integrated stabilisation and disaster protection into a single program, helping producers 
protect their farming operations from both small and large drops in income. From 2007 onwards, 
Canadian farmers can participate in the Growing Forward program consisting of various tranches 
of  coverage,  i.e.  AgriInvest,  AgriStability,  AgriInsurance,  and  AgriRecovery,  varying  in 
coverage and government participation.  
 
Since 1998, also the European Community has been intensively investigating the potential role 
of agricultural insurance programs in stabilising agricultural incomes (Meuwissen et al., 1999; 
OECD, 2000; European Commission, 2001; Cafiero et al., 2005; European Commission, 2005; 
European  Commission,  2006).  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  agreements  and  the  EU 
enlargement mean that agricultural policy in Europe is also evolving. As the insurance schemes 
and income stabilising tools developed in the USA and Canada seem legitimate in the WTO-
framework, i.e. they fit into the “green box” representing allowed forms of support, the European 
Community might also consider alternative risk financing tools. Moreover, in 2008, following 
the latest “CAP health check”, the European Parliament recommended, among others, to replace 
intervention systems for market crops by a safety net for crises, as well as to develop private 
sector or mixed insurance schemes, and to consider a Community-wide reinsurance system for 
climate-related or environmental disasters (European Parliament, 2008).  
 
In line with the above, ideas for an EU-wide income stabilization tool for farmers were launched 
in the summer of 2010. The scheme proposes to compensate farmers when their income drops 
below a certain level (compared to the average income). This implies that the government would 
assume  the  role  of  insurer.  Literature  generally  agrees  that  insuring  income  is  problematic, 
among others for reasons of measurability, incentives and the need to cope with increasing or 
declining trends of income. Problems would even be worsened due to the subsidies involved in 
the scheme. A recently finished EU-project on income stabilisation (FP6 Income Stabilisation) 
therefore argued for a “basket” of risk management solutions other than income insurance and 
specifically excluding premium subsidies (Meuwissen et al., 2008b). Suggested options included 
further  developing  derivatives,  the  use  of  futures  markets,  further  exploration  of  mutual 
insurance schemes and education of farmers and extension personnel in risk management issues. 
Government roles were suggested to be limited to direct damage compensation after a crisis 
event, preventive actions and lender of last resort solutions for some type of risks. In this context 
the current prominence of an income stabilisation tool as risk management program after 2013 
CAP  reforms  is  surprising.  This  paper  aims  to  elicit  expert  opinions  on  various  income 
stabilisation issues to see whether project conclusions potentially need to be finetuned. The paper 
first introduces the reader to the complexity of insuring components of income and price. Section 
3 presents materials and methods. Section 4 shows the results of the expert elicitation and section 
5 “makes up the balance”.  
 
2. Designing insurance for income and price  
 
2.1 The basic concept of insurance 
With insurance, an insured typically pays a premium to the insurer and receives an indemnity 
payment from the insurer once an insured loss occurs. The insurer is the party that pools the   4
risks, but risks are shared among the insureds. This sharing of risks among insureds manifests 
itself by additional premium assessments or dividend payments at the end of the policy period, 
and/or by premium adjustments at the beginning of the next policy period, all depending on the 
actual loss experience of the insurance pool. Insurance is widely available for personal risks (e.g. 
life insurance) and for a number of production risks such as hail.  
 
Two main factors that can limit the insurability of risks are asymmetric information and the 
correlation of risks among those insured. Asymmetric information exists when the would-be 
insured knows more about the risk being insured than does the insurer; this is the rule rather than 
the exception. Such asymmetry of information can lead to the dual problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Moral hazard occurs when an individual purchases an insurance policy and as a 
result of having purchased that policy alters his/her behaviour (production or management practices) 
so as to increase the potential magnitude of a loss and/or the probability of a loss. Adverse selection 
occurs when those purchasing insurance face a higher risk than those who do not, so that the rates 
developed on aggregate data underestimate the cost of indemnities to the insurer. To minimise the 
problems arising from asymmetric information, an insurance scheme should ideally cover only: 
(a) accidental and unintentional losses, as if losses are influenced by the management of the 
insured,  problems  of  moral  hazard  are  likely  to  arise;  (b)  measures  for  which  proper  risk 
classification  and  rate  making  are  possible,  thus  requiring  the  availability  of  sufficient  and 
reliable  data;  and  (c)  losses  that  are  determinable  and  measurable,  i.e.  for  a  proper  loss 
assessment the amount of loss and the extent to which the loss was caused by an insured event 
need to be unambiguous. In practice, all these conditions may not be fully satisfied, yet it may 
still be possible to develop a feasible insurance scheme using tools such as deductibles and co-
payments.  
 
The second factor that can limit the insurability of risk is where risk is correlated among those 
insured, i.e. where many policyholders can face losses at the same time. Examples of correlated 
risks  (also called  “systemic  risks”)  include  price  fluctuations,  floods,  droughts  and  livestock 
epidemics such as Foot and Mouth Disease. Insurance companies have problems dealing with 
such risks themselves and adequate reinsurance capacity is not usually available when the scale 
of the systemic risk is large. As a consequence, governments are often financially involved in 
providing  insurance  for  these  types  of  risk.  Developments  on  capital  markets,  such  as  the 
increasing “securitisation” of reinsurance, may reduce the need for government involvement in 
the future. 
 
2.2 Insuring whole-farm income 
Stabilizing  whole  farm  income  appeals  to  policy  makers  because  whole-farm  (or  farm 
household) income is the best measure of the welfare of farm families. In discussing an income 
insurance scheme, first the income measure to be used as a basis for insurance has to be defined. 
In choosing an appropriate income basis for the insurance, problems of moral hazard, adverse 
selection and the related problem of data availability play very important roles. In general, the 
income  measure  should  not  include:  (i)  non-farm  income  and  compensation  of  employees, 
because of moral hazard and fraud problems; (ii) fixed costs (rent and interest) and variable costs 
(for example feeding costs), because there is too much management of the farmer involved; and 
(iii) aspects that are more or less independent of current performance of the farm business, such 
as depreciation. Economic accounts would be too manipulative in revealing precisely the true   5
producer income loss and the threshold for triggering the indemnity payments. The reason is that 
the timing of input purchases and the amount of inventories could be used to show accounting 
results in the interest of the insured producer. An alternative could be to use a farmer’s tax 
returns. The merit of this approach is that farmers seldom overstate their incomes on tax returns, 
implying  that  the  insurance  coverage  will  never  be  too  high.  Besides  the  measurability  and 
incentive issues, there will also be the problem of systemic risks as many farmers will face low 
prices at the same time.  
 
2.3 Gross revenue insurance 
Insuring gross revenue (price times yield) takes account of the possibility that low yields can be 
offset by high prices and vice versa. Furthermore, gross revenue is better correlated with farm 
income  than  is  yield  or  commodity  price,  implying  that  insuring  gross  revenue  is  more 
satisfactory from the point of view of farmers who are seeking to reduce the riskiness of their 
incomes.  Gross  revenue  insurance  schemes  can  be  set  up  per  commodity  or  as  a  portfolio. 
Advantages of commodity-wise schemes are that farmers are free to choose which commodities 
they want to insure and at what levels, given for example the degree of specialisation of the farm 
and the relative importance of off-farm income. Farmers thus create their own efficient portfolio 
of risk management strategies. In addition, providers of insurance can focus on activities for 
which relevant data are available. Providing portfolio revenue insurance, however, has also some 
advantages: 
￿  Farm revenue correlates better with farm income than the gross revenue from one or two 
commodities, implying that insuring farm revenue contributes more to a producer’s welfare 
(which  is  a  function  of  the  net  income  distribution)  than  insuring  the  revenue  on  a 
commodity by commodity basis. 
￿  Farm revenue insurance will be cheaper since low revenues from one enterprise are likely to 
be partly offset by high revenues of another enterprise, as long as they are not perfectly 
positively correlated. This relates to the basic principle of diversification: aggregating similar 
independent risks into a single insurance pool reduces the variance of loss. 
Comparing portfolio revenue insurance with farm income insurance differences can be observed 
in rating and loss assessment methods. In the first scheme (adding gross revenues of different 
commodities) the rating of the price part can be based on observed futures market prices (not on, 
for example, a ten-year moving average). In the second scheme, however, there is no separate 
price component and rates can only be based on the distribution of revenues and on average 
values  in  previous  years.  Differences  also  exist  in  loss  assessment.  With  portfolio  revenue 
insurance moral hazard can be reduced, at least on the price part, by the use of observed futures 
market prices as a measure for price. In the second scheme, serious moral hazard problems can 
exist as farmers can report very low incomes. This is a problem even though farmers have to 
prove their losses and even if a farmer’s premium rate is (partly) based on his/her own income 
history. 
 
2.3 Price insurance 
In Europe, currently, price variability depends to a large extent on the level of price support. 
With  further  liberalisation  of  agricultural  markets  in  the  EU,  price  variability  of  products 
currently supported will tend to rise, though the effect will be less for products in large, highly 
integrated markets as can exist for grains. Large, well integrated markets are less volatile because 
of  less  than  perfect  correlation  in  yields  in  different,  widely  dispersed,  places.  Also  most   6
livestock product markets can be expected to become highly integrated because of the high value 
to bulk of these commodities. Potato markets are poorly integrated because potatoes are mostly 
water and are very perishable, making them very expensive to transport relative to their value. 
Note that some of the observable volatility in world commodity markets is caused by the price 
support measures in place in the EU and in North America. Farmers in those places do not get 
the  appropriate  signals  to  cut  back  on  production  when  prices  are  low,  and  vice  versa,  so 
magnifying price swings. Similarly, for some products, consumers face the same price under 
price support, regardless of the (world) supply situation. With the eventual removal of these 
distortions, supply will adjust more quickly to demand shifts, and vice versa, so dampening price 
swings. 
 
Price risks can be covered to some degree on futures and options markets (the basis risk cannot 
be covered). These are efficient markets for systemic price risks (Purcell, 1991). However, in 
Europe, the use of these markets is not yet widespread, mainly because of the existence of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (and other support programs related to the CAP). The attention 
being given to agricultural futures markets in Europe is however increasing due to declining 
agricultural  subsidisation,  the  specialisation  of  farms,  the  introduction  of  environmental  and 
production rights, and the increasing use of automated trade systems. The use of futures and 
options  markets can be  stimulated by  (i)  abolishing  price  support  (futures markets  can  only 
evolve in a competitive market; futures markets thrive on price uncertainties); (ii) education of 
farmers in the field of futures and options markets; and (iii) development of trading requirements 
(for example quality grading and standard definitions of commodities). Even when futures and 
options markets are more developed, experience shows that farmers are in general reluctant to 
use futures markets. Learning to use derivative markets requires a substantial investment of time. 
This overhead appears to be too high for most farmers. On the other hand, an agency such as an 
insurance company can spread the costs over many clients, making a product based on these 
markets potentially attractive to farmer clients. 
 
An insurance that includes price should establish prices yearly and futures market prices would 
be a good measure of price (though the farmer faces basis risk). For those commodities for which 
no  European  futures  markets  exist,  Chicago  Board  of  Trade  futures  prices  or  some  other 
transparent prices, such as the Rotterdam harbour prices for grain, might be useful. Commodities 
for which an objective price measure is available can be included in a price insurance. Attention 
should be paid in rating the prices from livestock commodities because of the existence of price 
cycles. However, this aspect is less of a problem when prices are established yearly, because the 
stage of the cycle may be reasonably apparent when the insurance contract is written. Attention 
should furthermore be paid to speciality products, and smaller volume crops in general, because 
a  small  increase  in production  can  have  a  significant  impact  on world  and  domestic  prices. 
Furthermore, speciality commodities have a large number of different varieties which can have 
very different prices. 
 
3. Materials and methods 
 
A total of 30 statements on risk management and income stabilisation issues were evaluated by a 
panel of 26 experts. Experts were from governments, farmers’ organization, research institutes 
and risk financing companies. They originated from Eastern EU countries as well as from other   7
EU countries. Statements were categorized into statements about the risk exposure (past and 
future),  risk  management  (availability  and  performance,  perception,  economics)  and  policy 
options for risk management. Statements were mostly based on FP6 Income Stabilisation project 
findings. Data  were  gathered in  a  one-day  workshop,  organized  as  a  satellite  meeting  to  an 
EEAE  seminar  on  risk  management  (Warsaw,  August  2008).  Before  experts  were  asked  to 
evaluate the statements, definitions and terminology were clearly explained. Statements were 
then  evaluated  on  a  four-point  scale,  ranging  from  1  (fully  disagree)  to  4  (fully  agree).  In 
presenting the results we differentiate between respondents from Eastern EU and non-Eastern 
EU countries as we expect to find differences between both groups. Eastern EU countries have 
for instance less access to insurance schemes, and risks of livestock epidemics are likely to be 




Results show that with regard to farmers’ risk exposure, experts believe that it is not only yield 
risks that are important but also market risks (statement 1 and statement 14). They furthermore 
perceive that farmers are generally used to large income fluctuations (statement 2) and that risks 
are not necessarily higher for weather exposed crop farms (statement 8). With regard to risk 
management, experts mostly agree that farmers do not perceive decoupled direct payments as a 
risk  management  tool  (statement  17)  but  that  such  payments  are  crucial  in  stabilizing  farm 
incomes (statement 6). Experts also believe that insurance schemes’ performance is improving 
(statement  10), but  that many  fields  are  largely  unexplored  and  not  well known  by  farmers 
(statements 26 and 16 respectively). With respect to on-farm risk management measures to cope 




As ways to go forward with income stabilization, results show a number of interesting findings. 
It is recognized that the current FADN system is not suitable for triggering crisis payments as the 
system is not keeping track of crises events (statement 4). The only possibility would be to use 
aggregate farm income data as discussed above under whole-farm income insurance, together 
with its complexity and problems of asymmetric information. Results also show that experts 
agree that education and risk management services might be useful strategies to support risk 
management practices at farm level (statements 27 and 30). Little agreement however is shown 
with  regard  to  the  premium  subsidies:  about  45%  perceives  subsidies  to  be  relevant  for 
developing derivatives and insurance schemes (statement 28) and believes even that insurance is 
only attractive in case of subsidies (statement 22).   
 
With regard to differences between Eastern and non-eastern EU experts, outcomes reveal that not 
many differences exist, although the ones that come out as significant are interesting. Statement 
5 shows that experts from non-Eastern EU regions expect changing WTO agreements to lead to 
more risks than the experts from the Eastern EU regions, probably because the latter are less 
used to various kinds of price support. Statements 12 and 21 support our expectation that Eastern 
EU countries are less well acquainted with the opportunities of insurance schemes as they do not 
greatly value innovative solutions in such schemes (statement 12) and mainly regard insurance to 
be relevant for catastrophic risks only (statement 21).    8
 
5. Outlook: making up the balance 
 
Having  reviewed  the  theoretical  issues  of  designing  income  insurance  and  the  practical 
considerations among risk financing experts in the European Union, we conclude that current 
intentions to launch the proposed EU wide income stabilization tool (i) is likely to face problems 
of asymmetric information reducing its effectiveness and increasing transaction costs; and (ii) 
may yet be too early as other public-private risk financing solutions covering (components of) 
income, especially in eastern EU countries have not yet been fully explored. (In other words: we 
believe that FP6 Income Stabilisation project conclusions as mentioned in the introduction are 
still viable.)  
   
It is understandable that policy makers are urged to look for alternatives to cover price risks after 
2013 CAP reforms, but results from our analyses show that private market opportunities such as 
futures markets (possibly offered as a price insurance scheme) are promising, needing no or only 
little amounts of subsidy (e.g. through farmer education programs). The advantage being that 
such  markets  are  privately  run,  immune  to  policy  pressure.  Income  stabilization  tools  as 
proposed by the European Commission however may continuously be in the center of policy 
debate because of the need to establish income trigger levels per year, per farm type, per country, 
corrected for trends, etc.  
 
We would therefore recommend to further explore the basket of risk management tools before 
introducing a scheme throughout the whole of the European Union. For instance, a “competitive” 
proposal might be to design a ‘business continuation insurance’ or ‘anti-bankruptcy insurance’. 
Such insurance scheme could make use of the debt-to-asset ratio of a farm and make payments if 
this ratio is at the bankruptcy (i.e. catastrophically low) level. Farmers (together with their banks) 
could establish a farm-specific ‘bankruptcy level’ and pay a premium according to this level. To 
prevent  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection,  accurate  data  and  objectively  established  asset 
measures are necessary, trigger levels should always be set very low, and, if, after payments, the 
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Table  1:  Level  of  agreement  on  risk  management  issues  in  the  European  Union  (1=fully 
disagree, 2=disagree, 3=agree, 4=fully agree), n=26
1.  








  Mean scores
2 






Past risk exposure               
1.  Income fluctuations are mainly determined by yield risks   4  54  42  -    2.58  2.25 
2.  Farmers are used to large income fluctuations  4  3  58  8    2.75  2.67 
3.  Catastrophic events hardly cause farmers to go broke  8  31  50  11    2.83  2.58 
4.  FADN data can not be used to trigger (crisis) risk 
payments 
-  23  46  31    2.92  3.17 
Future risk exposure               
5.  Overall, new WTO agreements have no significant 
impact on farm income levels and risk of low incomes 
19  54  23  4    2.42
**  1.83
** 
6.  In a less protective CAP, decoupled direct payments 
play a key role in stabilising farm incomes 
-  12  65  23    2.91  3.25 
7.  Some member states are more exposed to income falls 
than others 
-  4  65  31    3.17  3.33 
8.  Crop farms face higher probability of negative income 
than livestock farms 
4  46  46  4    2.67  2.25 
9.  Small (< 16 esu) and large farms (> 100 esu) are more 
threatened by the risk of low incomes than mid-sized 
farms 
4  54  38  4    2.55  2.27 
Review of the risk management arena               
10.  The performance of publicly provided crop insurance is 
improved due to e.g. surveillance and better risk 
evaluations 
-  25  67  8    2.82  2.91 
11.  Governments increasingly require farmers to contract 
insurance for being eligible for ad hoc disaster payments 
-  16  60  24    3.00  3.08 
12.  Many innovations, such as derivatives and public-private 
risk sharing, enlarge the opportunities for transferring 
risks 
-  12  56  32    3.00
**  3.5
** 
13.  Public(-private) compensation schemes for contagious 
animal diseases face problems of moral hazard 
-  29  63  8    2.80  2.83 
Risk and risk management perception               
14.  Crises are mainly caused by weather and market risks  -  19  46  35    3.25  3.17 
15.  Property insurance is the most important risk 
management tool 
-  42  50  8    2.75  2.58 
16.  Farmers are fully aware of all risk management tools 
available 
27  62  11  -    1.83  1.92 
17.  Decoupled payments are not perceived as a risk 
management tool 
12  19  61  8    2.50  2.75 
112 experts are from Eastern EU member states, 12 from other EU member states and 2 responded anonymously. 
2Asterisks (* and **) indicate significant differences, i.e. at P≤0.005 and P≤0.10 respectively.    11
Table 1 (continued): Level of agreement on risk management issues in the European Union 
(1=fully disagree, 2=disagree, 3=agree, 4=fully agree), n=26
1.  








  Mean scores
2 






The economics of risk management instruments               
18.  More liberal policies do not induce arable farmers to 
change their farm plan 
4  67  25  4    2.20  2.42 
19.  Diversification is not likely to become a key risk 
management tool 
8  42  42  8    2.58  2.33 
20.  Risk premiums per hectare differ substantially across 
member states 
-  4  71  25    3.08  3.40 
21.  Insurance schemes are only attractive for catastrophic 
events 
15  66  19  -    2.42
*  1.67
* 
22.  Insurance schemes are only attractive in case of 
premium subsidies 
4  52  44  -    2.33  2.36 
Policy options for risk management                
23.  Crisis risks are unforeseen, happen infrequently and 
related losses exceed the individual capacity to cope 
-  12  61  27    3.08  3.25 
24.  The only short-term way for public policy to deal with 
crisis risk, is to provide direct damage compensation 
8  39  38  15    2.58  2.58 
25.  Conditions for providing disaster relief need to be set at 
EU level 
4  35  42  19    2.75  2.83 
26.  Insurance schemes for production risks are 
underdeveloped 
-  19  73  8    2.75  3.00 
Public policy needs to facilitate private markets by:               
27.  educating farmers and extension workers in risk 
management issues and the use of derivate markets 
-  -  62  38    3.33  3.42 
28.  supporting the development of insurance and derivative 
markets, but without premium subsidies 
8  38  35  19    2.58  2.75 
29.  developing and operating mutual funds for specialty 
crops and animal diseases 
8  15  54  23    3.08  2.75 
30.  developing risk management services that take over 
farmers’ complex risk management tasks 
4  19  65  11    3.00  2.75 
112 experts are from Eastern EU member states, 12 from other EU member states and 2 responded anonymously. 
2Asterisks (* and **) indicate significant differences, i.e. at P≤0.005 and P≤0.10 respectively.  
 